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The meaning of the expression ‘a prima facie case’ as it is used in South Africa and 
in several other jurisdictions, and is considered also the nature of the role of the 
prosecutor in South Africa when considering whether or not a matter should be 
brought to trial is reviewed. It is argued that this involves considerations which 
are different from the question which the trial judge must consider at the end of 
the case for the prosecution in terms of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and 
that similar considerations are general to, and inherent in, the accusatorial mode 
of trial elsewhere. The Report by the Public Protector into the objections brought 
by a person of whom it was said by the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
that, despite the existence of a prima facie case of offences committed by that 
person there would be no prosecution, is reviewed.
Introduction
On 23 August 2003, evidently reacting to intense public interest in South 
Africa in a matter which entailed a protracted investigation by various 
State organs including the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions, the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions issued a press statement to the 
effect that-
‘After careful consideration in which we looked at the evidence and facts 
dispassionately, we have concluded that, whilst there is a prima facie case of 
corruption against the Deputy President, our prospects of success are not strong 
enough. That means that we are not sure if we have a winnable case’.
‘Accordingly, we have decided not to prosecute the Deputy President.’
1
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On 30 October 2003, the Deputy President referred this press statement 
to the Public Protector for his consideration2 in terms of the provisions of 
s 6 of the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 on the grounds that–
‘... [T]he decision not to prosecute by the National Director (supported by the 
Minister of Justice), whilst at the same time stating that there was a ‘prima facie’ 
case against me, has effectively denied me the opportunity to defend myself 
both as a citizen of this country and as a government offi cial holding a high 
ranking offi ce.’3
On 28 May 2004 the Public Protector, Adv. ML Mushwana, duly sub-
mitted an interim report (referred to hereafter as the Mushwana Report) 
to Parliament where it was considered. In it, the Public Protector discussed 
the law relating to, and the meaning of, the expression ‘a prima facie case’ 
with special reference to its use in a criminal context.
In summary, he remarked that its origin is ‘legalistic’ and that it is used 
not only by lawyers but also by journalists and others who often ‘quote 
it out of context and meaning’.4 Basing himself on the authoritative 
textbook by Hoffmann and Zeffertt,5 he noted two usages or meanings of 
the expression. The fi rst–
‘relate[s] to a particular stage in a civil or criminal case before a court of law 
when the presiding offi cer has to decide whether or not to decree absolution at 
the end of the case of the plaintiff or to discharge the accused at the end of the 
prosecution’s evidence’.
He then quoted from the book:
‘It is often said that in the absence of such evidence there is “no case to answer”, 
but the refusal of absolution or discharge does not necessarily mean that an 
answer is required. The defendant or accused may close his case at once and 
still succeed. In this sense, therefore, a ruling that a party has “made out a prima 
facie case” means only that his opponent runs the risk of losing if he offers no 
evidence.’
  Zuma against the National Director of Public Prosecutions and the National Prosecuting 
Authority in connection with a criminal investigation conducted against him, 28 May 
2004; available at http://www.pmg.org.za/bills/040529pprotect.htm accessed on 2 June, 
2005.
2   Other issues were also referred to the Public Protector, but they are not material to this 
article. To avoid any misunderstanding, the point must be made that the factual background 
to the incident which brought the matter to the attention of the Public Protector and 
the identity of the various individuals are irrelevant to this article. The Public Protector 
addressed the legal issues of the complaint before him in general terms, and his conclusions 
are of general application regardless of the nature of any allegations under consideration, 
or the identity of any individuals involved. This article is written in the same spirit.
3   Above [n1] para 3 3 2 1.
4   Mushwana Report, above (n1) para 21 1.
5   LH Hoffmann and DT Zeffertt The South African Law of Evidence; now see DT Zeffertt, 
A Paizes and A St Q Skeen, The South African Law of Evidence (2003).
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He emphasised that the question of whether a prima facie case exists or 
not is a matter for the court to decide.
The second meaning relates to what might be better called ‘prima facie 
proof’. The Public Protector quoted from Hoffmann and Zeffertt where 
the authors in turn quoted with approval what Stratford JA said in Ex 
parte Minister of Justice: re R v Jacobson and Levy: 
Prima facie evidence in its usual sense is used to mean prima facie proof of an 
issue, the burden of proving which is upon the party giving that evidence. In the 
absence of further evidence from the other side, the prima facie proof becomes 
conclusive proof and the party giving it discharges his onus.
6
Referring to S v Heller (2),7 S v Cooper8 and R v Blom,9 the Public 
Protector emphasised that the question of whether or not a prima 
facie case existed is a matter for the court to decide and this could be 
done only after the prosecution evidence had been heard and had been 
subjected to cross examination, the accused’s ‘version’ having been put 
to the prosecution’s witnesses for their comment. The court must then 
be satisfi ed that ‘a reasonable person might, in the absence of further 
contesting evidence by the accused, convict him/her of the crime he/she 
is being charged with’.
It followed inevitably that the Public Protector would conclude that 
the Press statement referred to above ‘was unfair and improper’, for it 
‘unjustifi ably infringed upon Mr Zuma’s constitutional right to human 
dignity and caused him to be improperly prejudiced.’10
The Mushwana Report is limited essentially to a brief statement of the 
South African law, so far as  this relates to the functioning of the prosecution, 
on the issues referred to it. It makes no attempt to consider in any depth 
the prima facie test or rule in any wider context – more specifi cally, the 
application of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act11 which relates to the 
discharge of an accused at the end of the prosecution’s case. The Report 
effectively – and correctly – makes it clear that there must be no blurring 
of, or link between, the prosecutor’s discretionary decision on whether 
to prosecute or not, and a judical offi cer’s discretionary application of 
the power created by s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act to discharge 
6  1931 AD 466 at 478.
7  1964 (1) SA 524 (W).
8  1976 (2) SA 875 (T).
9  1939 AD 188.
10 Mushwana report op cit (n1) paras 22 5 and 22 6.
11 Act 51 of 1977. Section 174 reads as follows:
‘If, at the close of the case for the prosecution at any trial, the court is of the opinion 
that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence referred to in the 
charge or any offence of which he may be convicted on the charge, it may return a 
verdict of not guilty.’
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at the end of the prosecution’s case. The point is an essential feature of 
the criminal process, and it refl ects the impact of the Bill of Rights on the 
criminal process.
The new human rights culture in South Africa, and in particular the 
protection of the right to human dignity, has had far-reaching effects on 
all aspects of the criminal process. Introduced in 1994 by the Interim 
Constitution12 and re-asserted more elegantly by s 10 of the Constitution,13 
it adds to the rights set out in s 35 of the Constitution which deal with 
arrested, detained, and accused persons. The changes in the substantive 
law and the procedures by which it is enforced are developing a regime 
in which criminal investigations and trials will not be arbitrary, brutal and 
degrading processes. While reform is still work in progress, the criminal 
justice system process, from start to fi nish, is at last developing into a more 
just and reliable machine for enforcing criminal justice than ever before in 
South Africa’s history.
The Bill of Rights, moreover, helps to make it a robust system: it strengthens 
it by laying down enforceable standards as protections against abuse, and 
it provides mechanisms to do the enforcing. However, the components of 
the criminal process must not be taken for granted and must be used only 
for the purposes for which they are intended and designed, starting with 
how suspicions or allegations of crime are dealt with. The mechanism as 
a whole must be treated with respect at all times if legitimacy, acceptance 
and respect by the community are to be accorded to its products: the 
preliminary investigations, decisions on whether to prosecute or not, 
any ensuing trials and verdicts, decisions on ancillary matters, and, in the 
event of convictions, the sentences. In Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek 
v Powell NO14 Sachs J listed several of these components and described 
them as ‘composite and mutually re-enforcing parts of the adversarial 
system of criminal justice that is deeply implanted in our country and 
resolutely affi rmed by the Constitution.’
The best criminal trial can offer no more than a decision, accepted by the 
community as legitimate, which refl ects the best possible approximation to 
what actually happened and which forms the substance of the allegations 
against the accused:
‘Participants in trials are encouraged by the formal procedures of the trial to try 
to reconstruct clear versions of possibly muddled real events. This opportunity 
to reconstruct symbolically an account of an incident implies that the portrayal 
of incidents in trials will often be clearer than the incident was in its natural 
12  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, s 10.
13  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.
14  1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at 1107.
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state...Indeed, actual incidents that were ambiguous for those involved or that 
might easily have developed in other directions are vulnerable to considerable 
reconstruction in the trial setting.’
15
The real world lacks the retroscopic powers of time-travel. If it existed, 
we would not need criminal trials at all. Without embarking on yet another 
journey into metaphysics and philosophy to defi ne ‘truth’, let us assume 
that most – perhaps even the overwhelming majority – of the results of 
the criminal justice process in a democratic society with an active human 
rights culture gain their legitimacy because they are popularly considered 
to be more or less congruent – within an acceptable margin of tolerance 
– with what one might call the ‘truth’.
In a system that strives to protect human rights in a democratic setting, 
it is possible to address at least to some extent the unease that comes 
from acknowledging that the very best courts may come to less than 
perfect conclusions. There is provision for appeals, for example, and 
the substantive law itself can be measured against the Constitution. One 
reason that the Constitutional Court in South Africa ruled that the death 
penalty was inconsistent with our Constitution was, in effect, because we 
might subsequently fi nd too late that the danger of an error, under which 
every trial court functions, was not merely potential but actual in the case 
before it.16 Putting a person to death as a sentence of the court involves 
a risk – however remote – of an irreparable mistake which is so ghastly 
that a society committed to a human rights culture cannot tolerate it. It 
endangers the legitimacy of the criminal process as a whole.
In such a society, criminal justice is not a game played on a level 
playing-fi eld – from the very outset, the prosecution plays uphill. The 
presumption of innocence, which can be rebutted only by proof of guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt, is merely the scene-setting starting point when 
a matter comes to trial. Before it even gets that far, it has to pass through 
the fi lter of the prosecutor’s discretion.
The prosecutor’s discretion
The policy directive
Behind the Mushwana Report lies the entire issue of the discretion of the 
prosecutor. This must be seen in the context of the independence of the 
institution itself.
15  W Lance Bennett and Martha Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom 
(1981) 167.
16  See per Chaskalson J in S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 145 -- a view with 
which all the judges concurred.
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The National Directorate of Public Prosecutions (NDPP)17 in South 
Africa is established by s 179 of the 1996 Constitution,18 and the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act19 was enacted as required by that section to 
give form and substance to it. Section 179(4) of the Constitution requires 
the legislation to ensure that the Authority acts ‘without fear, favour or 
prejudice’ when it exercises its power to institute criminal proceedings 
in terms of sub-s (2). The section, however, does not give any guidance 
on the criteria to be used when exercising that power, but requires the 
Director to determine the policy to be observed in the prosecution process 
and to issue Policy Directives accordingly.20
An interesting provision of the Act is that, in terms of s 22(4)( f  ), the 
NDPP–
‘shall bring the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors21 to the 
attention of the Directors and prosecutors and promote their respect for and 
compliance with the above-mentioned principles within the framework of 
national legislation...’
Attention is drawn to Guideline 17:
‘In countries where prosecutors are vested with discretionary functions, the law 
or published rules or regulations shall provide guidelines to enhance fairness 
and consistency of approach in taking decisions in the prosecution process, 
including institution or waiver of prosecution.’
It is in this context that one turns to the Policy Directive issued by the 
NDPP.22
The Directive states that–
‘In deciding whether or not to institute criminal proceedings against an accused, 
prosecutors should assess whether there is suffi cient and admissible evidence 
to provide a reasonable prospect of a successful prosecution. There must indeed 
be a reasonable prospect of a conviction, otherwise the prosecution should not 
be commenced or continued.’
23
The Directive provides guidance on how the decision should be 
approached, pointing out that it may be a diffi cult one to take. It advises 
prosecutors to consult with prospective witnesses, and to consider the 
‘version or the defence of an accused’. It states, ‘This test of a reasonable 
17  The abbreviation NDPP is used below to denote either the National Directorate as a whole, 
or the National Director, or (with conscious ambiguity) both, as the context requires.
18  Act 108 of 1996.
19 32 of 1998.
20 Paras. 5(a) and 5(b).
21  Available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp45.htm, accessed on 27 
October, 2004.
22  Available at http://www.npa.gov.za/npa/PolicyManuals/ProsecutionPolicy.doc accessed 
on 27 October, 2004.
23  Under ‘(a) General’, in Part 4,  ‘Criteria Governing the Decision to Prosecute’.
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prospect must be applied objectively after careful deliberation, to avoid an 
unjustifi ed prosecution.’24
Other provisions deal with ‘public interest’ considerations – where 
the prosecutor might decide that the public interest justifi es a decision 
not to proceed even if the ‘reasonable prospect’ test is met.25 As the 
National Director made no reference to this aspect in his comments and 
it was neither referred to nor considered by the Public Protector, it is not 
considered in this paper. In any event, the question of whether the public 
interest requires a prosecution can arise only after the ‘evidential limb’ of 
the process has been satisfi ed.26 
It should be noted that the references in the passages in the Directive 
quoted above are to ‘an accused’. The wording is unfortunate, as no 
decision will have yet been taken that the person should be prosecuted. 
The point is not trivial, for the rights guaranteed under s 35(3) of the 
Constitution accrue to a person who is an accused, and while some 
of these may be appropriate in relation to a suspect this is not a status 
which is dealt with expressly by the Constitution.27 In fact, the words 
‘suspect’ and ‘accused’ are used inconsistently throughout the Directive – 
sometimes correctly, and sometimes incorrectly. For example, in the fi rst 
paragraph of Part 4(a) the Directive notes that the process of deciding 
whether or not to prosecute often starts when ‘the suspect’ has been 
arrested, and the fi rst paragraph of Part 5(b) – which deals with restarting 
a prosecution – addresses the situation which arises when ‘a suspect or an 
accused is informed that there will not be a prosecution or that charges 
have been withdrawn’. These appear to be the correct use of the two 
terms, recognising the distinction between them. On the other hand, in 
24  Cf Dirk van Zyl Smit and Esther Steyn, ‘Prosecuting Authority in the New South Africa,’
in CIJL Yearbook, Justice Robert D Nicholson (Geneva: Centre for the independence of 
judges and lawyers, 2000), 150: the Directive ‘exhorts’ prosecutors to do ‘what all good 
prosecutors should do, namely not to proceed unless they have a reasonable prospect of 
securing a conviction‘.
25  The NDPP’s policy directive acknowledges that –
‘There is no rule in law which states that all the provable cases brought to the 
attention of the Prosecuting Authority must be prosecuted. On the contrary, any such 
rule would be too harsh and impose an impossible burden on the prosecutor and on 
a society interested in the fair administration of justice.’
Briefl y, the policy document then requires prosecutors to consider whether a prosecution 
is in the public interest, taking into account (amongst other matters) the nature and 
seriousness of the offence, the interests of the victim and the broader community, and the 
circumstances of the offender. Similar guidelines exist in other jurisdictions. 
26  Graham Mansfi eld and Jill Peay The Director of Public Prosecutions: Principles and 
Practices for the Crown Prosecutor (1987) 11.
27  Nico Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Commentary on the Constitution 
of South Africa (1998) 275.
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Part 3 (‘The Role of the Prosecutor’) it is stated that the prosecutor has to 
take ‘the decision whether or not to institute criminal proceedings against 
an accused’.28 However, unless a person has been arrested and formally 
indicted, served with a summons or handed a written notice then criminal 
proceedings have not yet been instituted and that person cannot be said 
to be ‘an accused’.29 
It appears that the three statuses of being an accused, someone who has 
been arrested (or detained), and a suspect overlap or interlock in various 
ways. The question arises: is there yet another type of status which 
one may occupy, in which one is a person about whom the NDPP may 
properly publish a statement to the effect of the one which was referred 
to the Public Protector? Such a person is most defi nitely not an accused, 
for the whole purpose of the statement is to announce that there will be 
no prosecution. As far as such a person being a suspect is concerned, in 
S v Sebejan,30 Satchwell J said that -
‘The crux of the distinction between the arrested person and the suspect is that 
the latter does not know without equivocation or ambiguity or at all that she 
is at risk of being charged. The suspect may herself have an inkling that she is 
mistrusted by the investigating offi cer; she may even have been told that she is at 
some risk of being arrested; but the suspect has not been placed on terms.’
31
The point is not trivial. If cases, legislation, regulations and various other 
sources – such as the NDPP’s Policy Directive – use the terms ‘accused’ 
and ‘suspect’ interchangeably or as if synonyms, then the protection of the 
constitutional rights of the individuals involved is seriously and prejudicially 
compromised due to the confusion and diffi culty in determining the extent 
of the constitutional protection afforded by s 35(3). Especially when a 
person is most vulnerable on the street or in the police station and before 
legal advice can be furnished, improper decisions based on a mistaken 
view of that person’s status may lead to irreparable damage to that which 
the Constitution seeks to safeguard. A deliberate ambiguity would make 
a nonsense of lawyers’ eternal quest for clarity, and the legal status of the 
individual involved requires clarity from the outset if the section is to be 
effective.This is clearly implicit in what Satchwell J said in Sebejan.
She noted also that ‘The Constitution is silent with regard to the rights 
of a suspect who is neither arrested nor detained’.32 The statement by the 
NDPP makes it clear that the person concerned, who was not detained, 
was not at risk of being charged or arrested, and it would appear that 
he was not a suspect either as described by Satchwell J. On the other 
28 Emphasis added.
29 Steytler, op cit (n27) 275.
30 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W).
31 Op cit 632.
32 Supra (n30) at 635.
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hand, the NDPP claimed that there was a ‘prima facie case’ against him; 
accordingly, it seems that if one were to argue that the Public Protector 
concluded wrongly that this was an improper thing to say, then this would 
create a new, hitherto-unknown status which a person might have – ie, 
of being someone who is not a suspect as defi ned by Satchwell J, nor an 
accused, nor detained, but who might nonetheless properly be described 
by the NDPP – and, be it noted, not by a court – as ‘prima facie’ guilty of 
a crime on the basis of evidence which has been subjected to the NDPP’s 
‘careful consideration’.
Confi dentiality
The Policy Directive describes itself as binding on the Prosecuting 
Authority, but it is not entirely clear how this is quality is enforced: 
presumably the procedures of administrative law would be involved. As 
far as any policies relating to confi dentiality are concerned, however, the 
Act is obviously applicable. The Directive warns that –
‘Prosecutors are not allowed to participate in public discussion of cases still 
before the court because this may infringe the rule against comment on pending 
cases and may violate the privacy of those involved.’
The Code of Conduct for Members of the National Prosecuting Authority 
published by the NPA33 enjoins its members to ‘preserve professional 
confi dentiality’; they should – 
‘refrain from making inappropriate media statements and other public 
communications or comments, about cases which are still pending or cases in 
which the time for appeal has not expired.’
Section 41(6) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act states that
‘Notwithstanding any other law, no person shall without the permission of the 
National Director or a person authorised in writing by the National Director 
disclose to any other person– 
(a)  any information which came to his or her knowledge in the performance of 
his or her functions in terms of this Act or any other law;
(b)  the contents of any book or document or any other item in the possession 
of the prosecuting authority; or
(c)  the record of any evidence given at an investigation as contemplated in 
section 28 (1),
      except –
 (i)  for the purpose of performing his or her functions in terms of this Act or 
any other law; or 
 (ii)  when required to do so by order of a court of law...’.34
33  Available at http://www.npa.gov.za/npa/PolicyManuals/CodeofConduct.doc accessed 
on 31May, 2005.
34 Section 41(6).
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It seems reasonable that a situation may arise in which the National 
Director may properly wish to let it be known publicly that in a particular 
matter there would be no prosecution of a named person; to determine, 
however, whether a statement to that effect is protected by s 41(6)(c)(i) its 
full contents must be considered. The complaint to the Public Protector35 
required a consideration of the criteria which prosecutors must apply 
when discharging their duty to decide whether or not to prosecute; the 
Public Protector having ruled that the NDPP had erred as a matter of law 
in regard to these criteria, it seems to follow that the NDPP could not have 
been covered by s 41(6)(c)(i) for he referred to confi dential matters which 
thus lay outside his role. On the other hand, while the fact that this may 
have caused the harm described by the Public Protector demonstrates why 
the requirement of confi dentiality is needed and exists, it is insuffi cient by 
itself to render the statement improper.
The issue of confi dentiality can be linked to the determination by 
the prosecutor of whether there is ‘suffi cient and admissible evidence 
to provide a reasonable prospect of a successful prosecution’. It seems 
reasonable that if prosecutors properly apply their minds to the matter, 
their thought processes might well involve the exercise of asking 
themselves whether a court might conclude that the admissible evidence 
amounts to a prima facie case for the accused to meet. It seems to be 
clearly implicit, however, in the Public Protector’s analysis that where 
there is a decision not to prosecute then  the limit of what can be properly 
disclosed as the reason for that decision is the result of the test on which 
the prosecutor’s conclusion must be based – ie, that there is insuffi cient 
and admissible evidence to provide a reasonable prospect of a successful 
prosecution.
The prosecutor’s discretion
As will be shown below, in other jurisdictions the discretion of an 
independent prosecutor is described in terms similar to those used in the 
Policy Directive in South Africa. They all require prosecutors to decide, as 
a discretionary matter, whether there is a ‘realistic prospect of conviction’ 
or ‘suffi cient evidence to obtain a conviction’, taking into account such 
objective and subjective factors as the admissibility of evidence and the 
quality and reliability of witnesses – whether they will ‘come up to proof’.36 
Mansfi eld and Peay write,
‘“Reasonable prospects” is both a subjective test which the prosecutor attempts 
to apply in an objective manner and an objective test applied, inevitably, on a 
subjective basis.’
37
35 See text relating to n3 above.
36 Mansfi eld and Peay op cit (n26).
37 Ibid.
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It is only when a decision has been taken that there is suffi cient 
admissible, substantial and reliable evidence that an identifi able person 
has committed an offence38 that the question of the public interest arises. 
As indicated earlier the ‘public interest’ factor is not dealt with here.
That the various prosecution authorities have similar policies is not an 
accident. The requirement that such a decision must be taken, and that 
it must be taken by the prosecutor and nobody else, is a consequence 
of the internal logic of the accusatorial model of criminal justice where 
the offi cers of the trial court (judge, prosecutor, and defence lawyers) 
are clearly distinguishable and independent, and where legal doctrines 
such as the presumption of innocence and the requirement that guilt 
must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt are part of the operational 
framework.
Mansfi eld and Peay analyse the concept of a ‘reasonable prospect’ of 
a conviction (‘whether a conviction is more likely than an acquittal’) as a 
logical matter in the context of the test for a conviction – proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt. They note three possible interpretations:
‘(i)  the prosecutor only has to establish that he has a reasonable prospect (a 
better than evens chance) of demonstrating that this case will be one of 
those (out of all those cases where he considers) where proof beyond 
reasonable doubt may be established;
(ii)   the prosecutor only has to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt and does 
not have to predict the erosive effects of the defence case or take them into 
account;
(iii)  proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a convenient legal fi ction that defi es 
either legal or mathematical quantifi cation.’39
It is not necessary for the purposes of this article to explore their analysis 
further and to prefer one or other of these meanings as best expressing 
the function of the prosecutor. Suffi ce it to note that Mansfi eld and Peay 
bring out the clear distinction between the function of the prosecutor 
who is deciding whether to proceed with a matter by laying a charge 
38  Cf David Gandy ‘The Crown Prosecution Service: Its Organisation and Philosophy,’ in The 
Role of the Prosecutor: Report of the International Criminal Justice Seminar Held at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science in January 1987 ed JE Hall Williams 
(1988) 12.
39  Op cit (n26) 190 (emphases in the original). It should be noted that the research by these 
authors was completed and written up before the Code for Crown Prosecutors was 
published, and that they were therefore unable to include a reference to it. They comment 
ruefully (viii):
‘Such an inclusion, at the time of writing, would have required the skills not of 
researchers, but of clairvoyants.’
Provided that one bears this in mind when referring to their work, their research remains 
invaluable and relevant.
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against a person – and, be it noted, changing the status of that person from 
a suspect to an accused – and bringing it to trial, on one hand; and, on the 
other hand, the function of the court in deciding whether the total body 
of evidence amounts to proof beyond all reasonable doubt. However one 
analyses the matter, the tests are manifestly not merely inherently different, 
but must be applied by different actors for different purposes. It does not 
seem to be relevant to this discussion that Mansfi eld and Peay were writing 
in the context of courts which include lay juries; what they consider must 
surely apply also to the relative tasks of the South African prosecutor 
and court for, when considering whether to prosecute or not, the South 
African prosecutor does not have to take into account how the trial court 
is constituted. It is, most specifi cally,  not the function of the prosecutor 
to take and to express a formal decision on guilt or innocence, for the 
decision that there is a reasonable prospect of a successful prosecution 
of someone suspected of an offence is a different one from the decision 
that the person is guilty of that offence. The prosecutor must not usurp 
the role of the judge.
It is trite that a conviction must be based on all the evidence, including 
that adduced by the defence, and it is exclusively for the trial court to 
decide whether what suffi ces to establish a prima facie case is also 
adequate to convict if that is all the evidence before it.40 It should be 
borne in mind that the contents of the dossier before the prosecutor may 
be materially different from the evidence before the court at the end of 
the prosecution case after it has been tested and challenged in cross-
examination. It is natural and correct that the tests should be described 
differently, for they are applied in different contexts for different purposes 
on different resources.
The words are considered more fully below, as well as aspects of s 174 
of the Criminal Procedure Act.
What is a ‘prima facie’ case?
The phrase ‘prima facie’ is used in several ways.
As a Latin adjectival phrase used by Gaius, it has been translated as ‘at 
fi rst sight’ and ’on the fi rst impression’. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defi nes – or perhaps translates – it as ‘Arising at fi rst sight; based or 
founded on the fi rst impression;’ it notes its legal association, defi ning 
a ‘prima facie case’ as ‘a case resting on prima facie evidence’. In South 
African law, it has been considered in a number of cases, some of which 
are referred to below.
40  See the very precise and lucid analysis in DT Zeffertt, AP Paizes, and A St Q Skeen The 
South African Law of Evidence (Cape Town: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) 121ff.
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As the Mushwana Report indicated, the question of whether a prima 
facie case has been established against an accused is a matter for the trial 
court. Once again, this is a necessary consequence of the internal logic 
of a trial based on the accusatorial model of criminal justice, and in South 
Africa is given statutory effect by s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act:41
‘If, at the close of the case for the prosecution at any trial, the court is of the 
opinion that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence 
referred to in the charge or any offence of which he may be convicted on the 
charge, it may return a verdict of not guilty.’
This does no more than state the common-law requirement that there 
must be a prima facie case at the end of the prosecution’s case if accuseds 
are to be put on their defence.42
In S v Zimmerie,43 Friedman J described the section as conferring a 
discretion on a court which must be exercised ‘in a judicial manner’.44 He 
went on to say that it would be in order to refuse an application for the 
discharge of the accused if there was reason to expect that the State case 
would be strengthened by defence evidence. Friedman J was following S v 
Shuping45 where Hiemstra CJ fi rst articulated the principle. However, the 
criticism46 which followed Hiemstra CJ’s judgment was given legal force 
in S v Lubaxa47 where, with the unanimous concurrence of a full bench 
of fi ve judges,48 Nugent AJA said that if, at the end of the prosecution 
case the only possibility of a conviction depended on self-incriminating 
evidence, the accused is entitled to be discharged:
‘The failure to discharge an accused in those circumstances, if necessary 
mero motu, is, in my view, a breach of the rights that are guaranteed by the 
Constitution and will ordinarily vitiate a conviction based exclusively upon his 
self-incriminatory evidence.
‘The right to be discharged at that stage of the trial does not necessarily arise, in 
my view, from considerations relating to the burden of proof (or its concomitant, 
the presumption of innocence) or the right of silence or the right not to testify, 
41  Act 51 of 1977.
42  Cf in England and Wales, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Schedule 3 cl 2(2), which 
provides that the judge may dismiss a charge ‘if it appears to him that the evidence against 
the applicant would not be suffi cient for a jury properly to convict him’.
43  1989 (3) SA 484 (C).
44  Supra (n43) 486.
45  1983 (2) SA 119 (B).
46  A St Q Skeen, ‘The decision to discharge an accused at the conclusion of the State case: A 
critical analysis’, (1985) 102  SALJ 286; H Rudolph, ‘The 1993 Constitution – Some thoughts 
on its effect on certain aspects of our system of criminal procedure’, (1994) 111 SALJ 497, 
510. See also S v Phuravhatha, 1992 (2) SACR 544 (V), S v Mathebula 1997 (1) SACR 10 
(W), S v Tsotetsi (2) 2003 (2) SACR 638 (W)
47 2001 (4) SA 1251 (SCA) at 1256-7.
48 Harms JA, Scott JA, Mpati JA, Conradie AJA and Nugent AJA.
       
292 SACJ    •    (2005) 3
but arguably from a consideration that is of more general application. Clearly a 
person ought not to be prosecuted in the absence of a minimum of evidence 
upon which he might be convicted, merely in the expectation that at some stage 
he might incriminate himself. That is recognised by the common-law principle 
that there should be “reasonable and probable” cause to believe that the accused 
is guilty of an offence before a prosecution is initiated ....’
It is submitted that the doubts cast on Zimmerie and Shuping are 
justifi ed and that it is unlikely that this line would be followed now.
This important passage puts the stamp of judicial approval to the test 
of ‘reasonable and probable cause’ as being the basis of a decision to 
prosecute, notwithstanding that the NDPP policy document uses the 
phrase ‘reasonable prospect of success’. There can be little difference 
in meaning between the phrases: both relate to the same decision to be 
taken at the same point in the criminal process.
Lubaxa’s case should be read with S v Legote,49 where judgment 
was given in the same court just fi ve months previously. Harms JA gave 
the unanimous judgment of the bench of three.50 He reviewed briefl y 
the background and history to the principle relating to the discharge of the 
accused at the end of the prosecution case, referring to Magmoed v Janse 
van Rensburg,51 and said that –
‘As die verhoor besig is om te ontaard of tot niks te lei nie, is die hof geregtig om 
‘n aanduiding daarvan te gee. Die bevoegdheid om ‘n saak aan die jurie te onttrek 
omdat daar nie voldoende getuienis teen die beskuldigde is nie, is heelwat ouer 




In Lubaxa, the full bench of the Supreme Court of Appeal confi rmed the 
view taken in Legote’s case that this would apply equally to represented 
and unrepresented accuseds. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to 
conclude that none of the judges in Lubaxa saw any confl ict between the 
two decisions,53 which should be interpreted as between them explaining 
the application of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Nugent AJA seems 
to have been aware of the distinction between what is necessary to invoke 
s 174 (a judicial decision) and what is required for a case even to come to 
trial at all (the prosecutor’s discretionary decision).
49  2001 (2) SACR 179 (SCA). Though showing that s 174 is subject to the Bill of Rights and 
the application od Zimmerie is now limited, they are not mentioned in this context by PM 
Bekker,  T Geldenhuis,  JJ Joubert et al Criminal Handbook 6 ed (2003).
51 1993 (1) SA 777(A).
52  If the trial is beginning to degenerate (‘ontaard’) or to come to nothing, the court has 
the power to give an indication of this. The obligation to withdraw a case from the jury 
because there is insuffi cient relevant evidence against the accused is considerably older 
than s 221(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917’: supra (n49) 184. 
53 The more so, as Harms JA gave the unanimous judgment in Legote.
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The effect of establishing a prima facie case is explained by Nugent 
AJA:
‘If, in the opinion of the trial court, there is evidence upon which the accused 
might reasonably be convicted, its duty is straightforward – the accused may not 
be discharged and the trial must continue to its end.’
54
It is convenient to describe this situation as one in which the prosecution 
has made out a prima facie case though it is, in fact, not easy to fi nd 
a defi nitive reference to the phrase ‘prima facie’ as used thus in South 
African criminal jurisprudence even though its use abounds. In S v Van 
den Berg55 it was used casually and in passing in this way by the Namibia, 
High Court, and this seems to characterise the usage – a general assumption 
that everyone knows what it means in practice. Occasionally, a fuller 
comment is made: a typical example is in S v Nzimande56 where the court 
referred to the presence of incriminating fi ngerprints as constituting a 
prima facie case which required a response from the accused:
‘Dit is by uitstek getuienis wat prima facie bewys daarstel en wat ‘n antwoord of 
verduideliking verg: dit word dan afdoende bewys as geen antwoord in die vorm 
van weerleggende getuienis aangebied word nie.’57
However, the matter is not so simple. More recently, in S v Ntshwence58 
the court referred to certain matters as merely constituting -
‘.....prima facie proof of the commission of the offence of contempt of court 
which may be upset by an accused’s explanation that her or his conduct was not 
deliberately intended to bring the court into disrepute’.
In Ex parte the Minister of Justice: in re R v Jacobson & Levy59, after the 
sentence used in the Mushwana Report,60 the court continued:
‘In the absence of further evidence from the other side, the prima facie proof 
becomes conclusive proof and the party giving it discharges his onus. It is not, 
however, in every case that the burden of proof can be discharged by giving 
less than complete proof on the issue; it depends upon the nature of the case 
and the relative ability of the parties to contribute evidence on that issue. If 
the party, on whom lies the burden of proof, goes as far as he reasonably can in 
producing evidence and that evidence “calls for an answer” then, in such case, 
he has produced prima facie proof, and, in the absence of an answer from the 
other side, it becomes conclusive proof and he completely discharges his onus 
54  Lubaxa, supra (n47) para. 11.
55  1996 (1) SACR 19 (Nm) at 63.
56 2003 (1) SACR 280 (O).
57  ‘It is pre-eminently evidence constituting prima facie proof and demands an answer 
or explanation: it becomes proof if no answer in the form of exculpatory evidence is 
offered.’
58  2004 (1) SACR 506 (TkD) at para 29.
59 1931 AD 466 at 478-9.
60 281 supra.
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of proof. If a doubtful or unsatisfactory answer is given it is equivalent to no 
answer and the prima facie proof, being undestroyed, again amounts to full 
proof.  These principles are to be extracted both from decisions in the Courts of 
South Africa and in England.’
This is, unfortunately, not as good a defi nition as one might need of a 
‘prima facie’ case, for there was no consideration of the predecessor of 
s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act,61 and the effects of the Constitution 
now need to be taken into account. In Jacobson and Levy itself, moreover, 
the matter was seen somewhat differently by Wessels ACJ. Putting aside 
his discussion of the situation where the onus of proof in the case of 
a criminal trial has been placed by the legislature on the accused, he 
emphasised that the burden of proof is always on the prosecution – an 
onus, he said, that never shifts. His further discussion suggests clearly 
that he was uncomfortable with the idea that a prima facie case would 
automatically and as a matter of course become conclusive proof in the 
absence of evidence from the accused.
The statement that in the absence of an answer from the other side 
prima facie proof becomes conclusive proof is, with respect, an erroneous 
and indeed a dangerous over-simplifi cation if this is understood to mean 
that the transformation is automatic. Even before Lubaxa, it was said 
in R v Jansen62 that this must be wrong and, in R v Broschk, van den 
Heever AJA quoted with approval63 a passage from the English case of R v 
Stoddart64 which the Lord Chancellor had himself earlier approved of in 
Woolmington v DPP:65
‘.....“prima facie” cases of guilt in the trials of a party charged with crime mean 
no more than that from the proof of certain facts the jury will be warranted in 
convicting the accused of the offence with which he is charged’.
Van den Heever AJA continued:
‘Nothing could have been stated in a plainer way. It does not mean that, if the 
accused fails to rebut the prima facie case, then the evidence becomes conclusive 
of his guilt. The Court must still consider whether, on the whole of the evidence, 
the Crown has proved the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. It 
then becomes a question of what weight should be attached to the evidence 
produced, having regard to the rule of the onus being always on the Crown.’
 Nugent AJA, in Lubaxa, was apparently aware of the point for he referred 
61  In former years, the law had to deal with jury trials also: see s 221(2) of the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act, 31 of 1917, which enabled the court to direct the jury to 
return a verdict of not guilty.
62  1937 CPD 301.
63 1946 OPD 303 at 312-3.
64 2 Cr App R 233.
65 DPP v. Woolmington [1935] All ER 1 (HL), [1935] AC 462.
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to a possibility and not a certainty of a conviction, saying that a prima 
facie case meant no more than that an accused might be convicted. 
The situation today seems to be that the court may refuse to discharge 
the accused under s 174 – which empowers the court to return a verdict 
of not guilty in the absence of a prima facie case – but it does not follow 
from the manner in which the section has been interpreted that if it does 
not use this power then the accused is guilty without more ado in the 
absence of defence evidence. Should there be no defence evidence, the 
body of evidence which the court has just found constituted a prima facie 
case must then be tested to the standard of proof beyond all reasonable 
doubt. The decision that the prosecution has made out a prima facie case 
means no more than that, in the absence of defence evidence, the accused 
runs the risk of being convicted66 – and however grave a risk it may be, it 
is no more than a risk:
‘It may depend upon “the relative ability of the parties to contribute evidence 
on that issue”.67 If it lies exclusively within the power of a party to show what 
the true facts were, his or her failure to do so may entitle the court to infer that 
the truth would not have supported his or her case; but if there is no reason to 
expect a party to be able to throw light on the facts, his or her silence can add 
nothing to the evidence adduced by his or her opponent.’.68
A little care needs to be exercised with this passage. In the absence of 
any defence evidence, the test in a criminal trial for deciding whether 
the total body of evidence before the court at the end of the prosecution 
case establishes a prima facie case remains very different from the test of 
whether that same body of evidence establishes guilt – ie, proof beyond 
all reasonable doubt. The caveat by Zeffertt in the above quotation is 
no more than an example of what might occur; it is neither necessary 
nor even possible to draw up an exhaustive list of situations where the 
prosecution case amounts to the total of evidence before the court and 
has been held to support a prima facie case, but may nevertheless fail to 
constitute conclusive proof of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. This is 
no more than a particular application of the general rule that the verdict 
is invariably a matter to be resolved by the court by a consideration of the 
whole body of testimony before it.
The fact that the accused may have tendered no evidence cannot create 
an exception to this and cannot lead as a matter of law to the conclusion 
that the prosecution has done all it needs to do to discharge its full criminal 
66 DT Zeffertt, AP Paizes, and A St Q Skeen, The South African Law of Evidence (2003) 124.
67 Jacobson and Levy’s case supra (n59) 9.
68 Supra (n66) 125.
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onus of proof.69 Even though Jacobson and Levy’s case was decided long 
before the new Constitution70 and has been relied on since then, the 
impact of s 35(3)(h) of the Bill of Rights71 cannot be escaped. Indeed, 
long before the Bill of Rights, Jacobson and Levy’s case was being treated 
with caution: in R v Mantell, for example, Bloch J said:
‘What is decisive is not the fact that there was no, or no acceptable, answer: it is 
the fact that what called for an answer was in the circumstances so cogent that, 
if unanswered, it would amount to “suffi cient proof”.....’72
This could be taken to mean that there must be evidence suffi cient to 
put a matter in issue, and if at the end of the day there is a doubt then it 
must be resolved in favour of the accused.73 In New Zealand Construction 
(Pty) Ltd v Carpet Craft74 it was said by Leon J that if full effect were given 
to the approach in Jacobson and Levy’s case – 
‘....it would follow that every prima facie case, however weak, would become 
conclusive in the absence of evidence from the other side. With due deference to 
those cases I would respectfully doubt whether such a conclusion would always 
be justifi ed. If it were proper to have regard to this piecemeal form of reasoning 
I would prefer to say that the prima facie case may become conclusive.’
Though the point is of little more than academic interest now, it seems 
that the law was probably as described above even before the Bill of 
Rights.
Canadian law
These matters have been considered in the context of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, and its similarity with the South African Bill of 
Rights makes the Canadian experience useful. In Dubois v R,75 Lamer J 
said that the Canadian Constitution –
‘imposes upon the Crown the burden of proving the accused’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt as well as that of making out the case against the accused before 
he or she need respond, either by testifying or by calling other evidence.’76
69  See New Zealand Construction (Pty) Ltd V Carpet Craft  1976 (1) SA 345 (N), where 
similar unease was expressed about the meaning of Jacobson and Levy’s case in the 
context of a civil trial. In this case, Leon J relied on R v Mantell 1959 (1) SA 771 (C) in 
support.
70  Act 108 of 1996.
71  Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the ‘right.....to be presumed 
innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings....’
72  1959 (1) SA 771 (C), 776 (emphasis added); Bloch J said that he preferred this phrase to 
‘full’ or ‘complete’ or ‘conclusive’ proof, as used as used in Jacobson and Levy’s case supra 
(n59) at 478-9.  
73  Cf S v Trickett 1973 (3) SA 526 (T), per Marais J at 537.
74 1976 (1) SA 345 (N) at 348.
75 23 DLR (4th) 503.
76 Supra (n75) at para 41.
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Referring with approval to various commentators on the Canadian 
law, he said that the idea of a ‘case to meet’ is what protects the non-
compellability rule.77 The effect is that the Crown must prove its case 
before there can be any expectation of a response from the accused, but 
the burden of proving guilt beyond all reasonable doubt remains on the 
prosecution to the end.78 Quoting from one authority, he said:
‘The accused need only respond once. The Crown must present its evidence at 
an open trial. The accused is entitled to test and to attack it. If it does not reach 
a certain standard, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. If it does reach that 
standard, then and only then is the accused required to respond or to stand 
convicted.79
The standard referred to is, in short, what can be called a prima facie 
case.
English law
Similar provisions are to be found in England and Wales. In a Crown Court 
trial on indictment, the judge may dismiss a charge ‘if it appears to him 
that the evidence against the applicant would not be suffi cient for a jury 
properly to convict him’.80 The current editors of Archbold state that 
a submission that there is no case to answer should be allowed where 
there is no evidence ‘upon which, if the evidence adduced were accepted, 
a reasonable jury, properly directed, could convict’.81 In the case of a 
summary trial, they observe that the magistrates are the judges of both facts 
and law and accordingly they submit that at the close of  the prosecution 
case or later, if there is some evidence which, if accepted, would entitle 
a reasonable tribunal to convict, they nevertheless have the same right as 
a jury to acquit if they do not accept this evidence, whether because it is 
confl icting, or has been contradicted, or for any other reason.82 
Prosecution policy in other jurisdictions
The policy of the NDPP that there must be a ‘reasonable prospect of a 
conviction’ for a prosecution to be commenced or continued is similar 
to the stipulated requirements in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. 
The similarity with the United Kingdom is unsurprising, given the strong 
77  In South Africa, this would be ss 35(1) and 35(3)(h) and (j) of the Bill of Rights. 
78  ‘The Role of the Accused in the Criminal Process’ in Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin eds The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Commentary (1982) at 335, 358-9.
79  E Ratushny, Self-incrimination in the Canadian Criminal Process (1979) 180.
80  Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Schedule 3 cl 2(2).
81  John Frederick Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice gen ed PJ 
Richardson (2004) at para 4–292.
82  Archbold, op cit (n81) at para 4-296.
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historical infl uence, but this becomes less signifi cant when one fi nds 
parallells elsewhere. In fact, the wide similarity refl ects a necessary feature 
and consequence of an accusatorial system83 of criminal justice. What 
follows is but the barest survey of several countries in order to show that 
basically similar procedures are found where the accusatorial model of 
criminal process is followed. South Africa, in other words, is not unique.
England and Wales
The Crown Prosecution Service publishes an document analogous to the 
one by the NDPP in South Africa. The Code for Crown Prosecutors84 states 
that
‘5.1 Crown Prosecutors must be satisfi ed that there is enough evidence to 
provide a “realistic prospect of conviction” against each defendant on each 
charge. They must consider what the defence case may be, and how that is likely 
to affect the prosecution case.
5.2 A realistic prospect of conviction is an objective test. It means that a jury 
or bench of magistrates, properly directed in accordance with the law, is 
more likely than not to convict the defendant of the charge alleged. This is a 
separate test from the one that the criminal courts themselves must apply. A 
jury or magistrates’ court should only convict if satisfi ed so that it is sure of a 
defendant’s guilt.
5.3 When deciding whether there is enough evidence to prosecute, Crown 
Prosecutors must consider whether the evidence can be used and is reliable. 
There will be many cases in which the evidence does not give any cause for 
concern. But there will also be cases in which the evidence may not be as strong 
as it fi rst appears....’
The code continues by offering guidance to prosecutors when addressing 
these matters.
Scotland
As Scotland constitutes a separate jurisdiction within the United Kingdom 
for many purposes, the Crown Offi ce and Procurator Fiscal Service have 
83  Contrast the criminal process in this regard with the inquisitorial model in eg Germany: 
Hans-Heinrich Jescheck ‘The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West 
Germany’ (1970) 18 AmJCompL 508, 509. The author draws attention to the ‘legality 
principle’ which has the effect of preventing the use of discretion on the part of the state’s 
attorney in the institution or pursuit of investigation into criminal activity, and further –
‘...forbids any exercise of discretion in the decision whether, on the basis of his 
investigation, he has evidence suffi cient to press charges’.
  Jescheck’s article is one of several in a symposium which also covers France, Canada, 
Japan, and the United States of America.
84  Available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/codeeng.pdf, accessed on 4 
November, 2004.
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published separately the policy85 relating to their prosecution processes, 
as well as a code.
The policy statement gives an account of the structures involved, the 
Procurator Fiscal being responsible at local level for the investigation and 
prosecution of crime in the public interest. It is interesting that – similar 
in certain respects to South Africa – the prosecutor in Scotland has a 
statutory power to direct the police in the investigation of crime:
‘The decision whether criminal proceedings should be commenced rests with 
the Procurator Fiscal, whether or not any person has been arrested or “charged” 
by the police. The Procurator Fiscal’s discretion to prosecute or not is a principal 
feature of the system. There is no rule of law in Scotland that a criminal offence 
must be prosecuted. No one can oblige the Lord Advocate to prosecute, and no 
one except the Lord Advocate can oblige the Procurator Fiscal to prosecute.
...
‘Before taking any action on a matter reported to him, the Procurator Fiscal 
must be satisfi ed that the circumstances disclose a crime known to the law 
of Scotland. He must then consider whether there is suffi cient admissible and 
reliable evidence to obtain a conviction. If the evidence appears to be insuffi cient 
the Procurator Fiscal can instruct the police to carry out further enquiries. If the 
Procurator Fiscal is satisfi ed after full inquiry that the evidence is insuffi cient he 
will take no proceedings.’
A fuller account of the actual practice governing prosecutions is 
published in the code.86 This says that for a prosecution to commence 
the Procurator Fiscal must be satisfi ed that there is ‘suffi cient admissible 
evidence to justify commencing proceedings’.87 Generally this requires 
corroboration, and the code deals with questions of admissibility, reliability 
and credibility.
Both the policy statement and the code address the issue of confi -
dentiality, and the relevant passages are worth quoting in full. According 
to the policy statement:
‘When Crown Counsel or the Procurator Fiscal decide not to prosecute 
there will be good reasons for that decision, which will be based on careful, 
professional consideration of the case and the relevant law. There are sound 
reasons for the established practice of not explaining those reasons to a third 
party. For example, the prosecutor will often have based his decision on reports 
and statements that are confi dential. It would be a betrayal of the witnesses’ 
trust if their evidence were made public other than in court. Moreover, if the 
prosecutor disclosed that he believed the victim, and would have prosecuted if 
85  Available at http://www.crownoffi ce.gov.uk/departmental/sole_public_pros.htm, accessed 
on 4 November, 2004.
86  Crown Offi ce and Procurator Fiscal Service, Prosecution Code; available at http://www.
crownoffi ce.gov.uk/publications/CO_Pcode.pdf accessed on 5 November, 2004.
87  Op cit (n86) 4.
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there had been any supporting evidence, this would amount to condemning the 
accused publicly without a trial. Equally, if the prosecutor referred publicly to his 
assessment of the victim’s account, this could prove extremely damaging to the 
victim. The only proper place for the Crown to comment publicly on these and 
similar matters is in court.’
The code adds a little to this:
‘The prosecutor cannot disclose publicly the detailed reasons for a decision in 
a particular case. There are a number of reasons for this policy; the decision will 
have been based on confi dential information, for example information relating 
to matters such as the credibility, reliability or state of health of an essential 
witness or details of police operations.
‘Furthermore, public disclosure of the reasons for not proceeding or for 
accepting reduced pleas may expose the accused person to accusations of crime 
in circumstances where he no longer has the opportunity of defending himself 
against such allegations in a court of law.’88
United States
It is impossible in the present context to provide a full review of the 
relevant components in the criminal justice process in the United States. 
However, to the extent that this article is concerned with one aspect of 
the discretion to prosecute as exercised by persons who have the duty 
to initiate criminal proceedings, note should be taken of the standards 
set out by the American Bar Association in its review of the prosecution 
function:89
‘A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the 
continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the 
charges are not supported by probable cause. A prosecutor should not institute, 
cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in 
the absence of suffi cient admissible evidence to support a conviction.’90
According to Salzberg and Capra, writing generally about prosecution 
decisions, the prosecution must believe that the evidence is suffi cient 
to secure a conviction, and that it is in the community’s best interest to 
prosecute the suspect.91
While criminal justice in the United States is accusatorial, it is impossible 
and potentially confusing to attempt any general, direct and detailed 
comparisons between the United States and other jurisdictions with 
88  Op cit (n86) 12.
89  Available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc_blk.html#1.2 accessed on 
8 November, 2004.
90  Supra (n89) Standard 3-3.9 ‘Discretion in the Charging Decision’.
91  Stephen A Salzberg and Daniel J Capra, American Criminal Procedure: Cases and 
Commentary (1992), 158. The authors also state that the prosecution must believe that 
the suspect is guilty. 
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accusatorial models of criminal trials. This is because of the practice in some 
states of electing prosecutors by popular vote, the role of the Grand Jury, 
and the scope and nature of the discretion exercised by the prosecution. 
A further complication is that there are several different procedures in 
various state and federal jurisdictions. However, all jurisdictions operate 
procedures to screen cases before they come to trial in order to make 
an independent determination whether suffi cient evidence exists for a 
reasonable person to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the 
accused has committed it.92 The phrases ‘a prima facie case’ and ‘probable 
cause’, for the purposes of this article, have much the same meaning in 
the United States; in the broadest sense, they are used to explain criteria 
to decide whether there is suffi cient admissible evidence in a matter to 
proceed to seizing a jury with the fi nal decision on a verdict.93
Canada
The Deskbook published by the Canadian Federal Prosecution Service94 
sets out the relevant policies. In summary, the fi rst question to be decided is 
whether the evidence is suffi cient to justify the institution or continuation 
of proceedings; the second is whether the public interest requires that a 
prosecution should be pursued.95 As already indicated, the issues raised by 
the second question are not developed in this article.
So far as the suffi ciency of evidence is concerned, the Deskbook states:
‘In the assessment of the evidence, a bare prima facie case is not enough; the 
evidence must demonstrate that there is a reasonable prospect of conviction. 
This decision requires an evaluation of how strong the case is likely to be when 
presented at trial. This evaluation should be made on the assumption that the 
trier of fact will act impartially and according to law.
‘A proper assessment of the evidence will take into account such matters as the 
availability, competence and credibility of witnesses and their likely impression 
on the trier of fact, as well as the admissibility of evidence implicating the 
accused. Crown counsel should also consider any defences that are plainly 
open to or have been indicated by the accused, and any other factors which 
could affect the prospect of a conviction; for example, the existence of a Charter 
violation that will undoubtedly lead to the exclusion of evidence essential 
to sustain a conviction. Crown counsel are expected to apply this evidential 
92  See  Joan E Jacoby The American Prosecutor: A Search for Identity (1980) 145.
93  For a meticulous examination of the jurisprudence, see Barbara J Shapiro ‘Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt’ and ‘Probable cause’: Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American 
Law of Evidence (1991) esp 100ff.
94  Available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/fpsdeskbook.pdf, accessed on 12 November, 
2004.
95  Op cit (n94) Part V, ‘Proceedings at trial and on appeal’ para 15.2. 
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standard throughout the proceedings – from the time the investigative report is 
fi rst received until the time of trial...’96
The reference to ‘a bare prima facie case’ should be compared with 
what the NDPP in South Africa is reported as having said – ie, ‘that, whilst 
there is a prima facie case... our prospects of success are not strong 
enough’ and that accordingly there would be no prosecution. Whatever 
the phrase used in the Deskbook might mean, it denotes something which 
the Canadian prosecutor is instructed to regard as being an inadequate 
basis on which to proceed.
Conclusion
Every profession, trade and discipline has its technical vocabulary which 
its practitioners use to communicate clearly, unambiguously and accurately 
and indeed safely. For example, the differences between a ‘virus’ and a 
‘bacterium’ are fundamental; the words and the concepts they express 
are neither ambiguous nor interchangeable, and their misuse may be 
lethal. Accordingly, a failure by someone trained in the medical sciences 
and related disciplines to respect their distinct meanings displays not 
merely ignorance but the gravest incompetence. When lay persons – and 
especially journalists – use a technical vocabulary to communicate to 
others it behoves them to do elementary research and to be sure that 
the words are used correctly, and the example given above is a typical 
case where misuse seems to be a common phenomenon. News readers or 
editors who protest at what appears to be pedantry must then make out a 
case in defence of ignorance.
It goes without saying that when practitioners use the vocabulary of 
their own art and discipline to communicate with a lay audience, they 
must choose their words with care to avoid confusion and ambiguity. 
They may have to qualify their words, or generalise carefully or explain 
as they proceed, but they must never misuse their vocabulary or mislead 
their audience.
The science of law is no different. The short point is that by taking 
the discretionary decision to prosecute, the prosecutor signals that the 
decision has been taken that there is a reasonable prospect that the guilt 
of the suspect – who now becomes an accused – can be proved beyond 
all reasonable doubt97 – and that is the full extent of the decision. To 
succeed, the prosecutor must fi rst establish a prima facie case for the 
accused to meet; this must be done in open court by means of evidence 
96  Op. cit (n94) Part V ‘Proceedings at trial and on appeal’ para 15.3.1; emphases in the 
original. 
97 Cf the policy document of the NDPP; see text at n22 above.
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which is suffi cient both in quantity and tested quality to persuade the trial 
judge whose exclusive decision this is. It is submitted that the proper 
words in the vocabulary of the lawyers’ art and science to describe the 
test for the trial judge exclusively, at the end of the prosecution case and 
before a single defence witness has been heard, are these: is there a prima 
facie case for the accused to meet?
The discretionary decision to be taken by the prosecutor and the judicial 
decisions to be taken by the trial judge are each based on very different 
bodies of material and are quite different qualitatively. Even though what 
the prosecutor has to consider includes sworn affi davits, this material has 
not yet been heard and tested and challenged in open court. In the strictest 
legal sense of the word, it is not yet even evidence on the substance of 
the allegations against the accused; it becomes evidence only when it has 
been ruled to be admissible as such by the trial court,98 to which it has still 
to be presented in the proper form required by the law for its admissibility 
to be determined – however straightforward that may be. Further, the 
prosecutor’s decision is one from which there can be no appeal,99 and it is 
taken behind closed doors. It is based on what potential witnesses might 
98 Roderick Bagshaw et al Phipson on Evidence 15 ed (2000) 2 para 1–03
‘Evidence, as used in judicial proceedings, has several meanings..... Evidence, in the 
fi rst sense, means the testimony, whether oral, documentary or real, which may be 
legally received in order to prove or disprove some facts in dispute. In the second 
sense it means the contents of that testimony.’
  Colin Tapper, ed., Cross and Tapper on Evidence 9 ed. (1999), 1 prefers to use the phrase 
‘judicial evidence’ to distinguish evidence generally of a fact (‘that which tends to prove it 
– something which may satisfy an inquirer of the fact’s existence’) from that which a court 
will receive.
99  However, in England and Wales a decision not to prosecute may be subject to judicial 
review: see Archbold above n81 para. 1–263, which notes that the power to do so ‘is 
one that is to be sparingly exercised’. Likewise, the decision to institute a prosecution is 
also reviewable, but only in rare and exceptional situations such as demonstrable fraud, 
corruption, mala fi des or a failure to follow settled policies on the part of the decision 
maker. In the last-mentioned context, Archbold is apparently referring to the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors above (n84). In South Africa, it cannot be doubted that the regime 
established under 1996 Constitution preserves the High Court’s common law power to 
review and to set aside a prosecutor’s decision on the grounds that it was taken mala fi de 
or from ulterior motive, or because the prosecutor failed to apply his mind to the matter: cf 
Mitchell v Attorney-General, Natal 1992 (2) SACR 68 (N), though the particular legislation 
involved in that case would be wholly unconstitutional today.  By s 1(b)(ff) a decision 
to institute or continue a prosecution is not subject to review under the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. In Kaunda v President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2005 (1) SACR 111 (CC), the Constitutional Court noted that the Act does not deal 
specifi cally with a decision not to prosecute; it assumed in favour of the applicants before 
it that there might possibly be circumstances in which such a decision could be reviewed, 
but concluded that this did not avail them. If such a power does exist, it appears that it 
would be wider than the common-law power: De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Witwatersrand Local Division, 2003 (1) SACR 448 (W).
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say – sources who have not been tested in cross-examination in open 
court and who been confronted with those aspects of the defence case 
which are material to their testimony.
By contrast, at the end of the prosecution case the trial court has real 
evidence before it when it considers whether a prima facie case has been 
made out for the accused to meet – in South Africa, this is the stage at 
which s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act becomes relevant. As shown 
above, the test under it is of a totally different nature. Because the material 
available to the prosecution has not been tested before it comes to trial, 
the decision to prosecute might be entirely reasonable. But only after the 
prosecution case has ended, can the matter be considered judicially: is 
there a prima facie case?
Finally, whether or not this body of evidence is the fi nal total of the 
evidence on which the court has to reach its verdict, the test is different 
again: it remains the duty of the trial court alone to decide, on all the 
evidence before it, whether the accused’s guilt has been proved beyond 
all reasonable doubt. The fact that the defence may have offered no 
evidence does not alter the nature of the fi nal decision to be taken by 
the trial court; it merely affects the fi nal body of evidence on which that 
decision must be based.
The concept of ‘a prima facie case’ is inextricably linked to the 
requirement that the trial court exclusively is permitted  to decide 
whether one can be said to have been made out or not. This is made 
clear explicitly by the Mushwana Report. This linkage, however, is not 
merely the result of an arbitrary rule formalised by the law. It is a matter 
of logic and justice in the context of the criminal process that if one of 
the meanings of the expression is that a person has a case to meet, then it 
would be preposterous to deny that person the rights of an accused and 
thus an opportunity to meet it. If the prosecution could claim outside of 
the court and without laying any charge that there is a prima facie case 
against an individual, the very defi nition of a prima facie case demands 
that the accused be given the opportunity to make an answer – but an 
answer to what and made where, if not in open court to evidence which 
has been heard and tested there? If the Mushwana Report is wrong, then 
logically the National Director’s discretionary decision not to prosecute 
was based on the view that as Mr Zuma was prima facie guilty, it was 
better that he should not be tried as an acquittal for want of evidence 
would have been a miscarriage of justice.
It is of great signifi cance that the prosecutor’s decision is taken behind 
closed doors, and is not appealable. These are central elements of the 
accusatorial model of criminal justice, and it is for these reasons that such 
great importance is attached to the independence of prosecutors, and 
such emphasis placed on the transparency of the process by which they 
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are appointed. The National Directorate of Public Prosecutions in South 
Africa is not part of the judicial arm of the state,100 and a statement by the 
NDPP that a person who will not be brought to trial is nonetheless prima 
facie guilty of an offence does not honour that fundamental aspect of the 
Constitution. The importance of this cannot be overstated.
Attention has already been drawn to the confi dentiality which is 
required on the part of the prosecution,101 and it seems that the need for 
such conduct is obvious. The treatment of the matter in Scotland should 
be noted – the policy and Code of the Crown Offi ce and Procurator Fiscal 
Service spell out clearly the reasons. It is not apparent how prosecutors’ 
functions in South Africa are so different that prosecutors can be required 
to state an opinion, publicly and outside of a court, whether or not there 
is a prima facie case in any matter before them. Apart from any other 
considerations, as has been shown above it is not within the competence 
of the prosecutor to make such a statement. To the extent that publicity 
needs to be given to a decision not to proceed in any case, it is hard to 
visualise how it can ever be necessary to do more than to state simply 
just that much.102 To say more risks not merely the harm highlighted in 
the Mushwana report and the code applying to the Procurator Fiscal in 
Scotland – great damage to individuals – but also the confusing misuse of 
the language of the law.
100   Certifi cation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) SA 744 
(CC) at paras 140-6. 
101   Above text at n84.
102   This is, of course, apart from any decision based on the ‘public interest’ criterion. It is 
submitted, however, that here too for similar reasons explanations should not be given.
       
